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ABSTRACT

There is an ambition to conceive of the human being as a composite of perceptual and
desiderative faculties belonging to a causal order and a rational faculty belonging to a normative
order. The problem is that this conception is unstable: If we locate the perceptual/desiderative
faculties in a causal order, no room is left for the rational faculty. Consequently, to conceive the
human being in full, one must alternate between two different points of view. In this paper, I
argue that the solution is to reevaluate how we think about causes and norms: To say something
is determined by causes is not just to locate it within a causal order but is more fundamentally to
exclude it from our evaluative practices. Further, to say something is constrained by norms is not
just to identify a set of evaluative practices but is more fundamentally to include it in our
evaluative practices.
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1

INTRODUCTION

The Kantian bifurcation of the human being into two parts, one determined by causes and
the other constrained by norms, has often been given a psychological characterization. On this
characterization, the cause-determined part is the locus of perceptual and desiderative capacities
shared with the other animals, while the norm-constrained part is the locus of uniquely human
reflective capacities. Given the presence of these parts in the human being, two states are
possible: Either the human being’s reflective capacities are disengaged, in which case her
motions are caused by perceptions and desires which themselves have a causal origin, or her
reflective capacities are engaged, in which case her motions are the causal outputs of normconstrained discursive activity taking perceptions and desires as causal inputs.1
In this paper I aim to call into doubt the tenability of a psychological characterization of
the Kantian bifurcation. My worry is that from a psychological standpoint, what I have called
‘norm-constrained discursive activity’ are causal proceedings and are therefore unintelligible as
reasonable behavior. After developing this worry, I will put forward a practice-based
characterization of the bifurcation. On this view, the human being is divided into a reflective part
that is included in our practices and a perceptual/desiderative part that is excluded from our
practices. My hope is that by providing a practice-based account, the ground will be set for
developing a positive Kantian account of human agency that captures in more realistic terms the
way in which desires and perceptions relate to reason.2

1

This is of course a simplification, but I take it to be acceptable in broad outline. I have intentionally avoided
engaging too heavily with the extensive literature on Kant’s empirical psychology (see, for example, Frierson
(2014)), particularly as developed in the Anthropology, because much of this literature takes for granted what I have
set out to critique here. Instead, my primary interlocutors are those philosophers who attempt to ground normativity
in our psychological natures (e.g., Korsgaard (1996) and Frankfurt (1971)).
2
What do I mean by a ‘practice’? As a first pass attempt to answer this question, we might turn to Rawls, who
identifies a practice as “any form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines offices, roles, moves,
penalties, defenses, and so on, and which gives the activity its structure. As examples one may think of games and
rituals, trials, and parliaments.” (Rawls 1955: 3).
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Although I will spend much of this work defending a practice-based view against a
psychological view of the bifurcation, my broader aim is to argue against a common way of
thinking about causes and norms.3 Call this way of thinking ‘objectivist’ and take as its basic
commitments the views 1) to say something is determined by causes is to say there do not exist
practices of an appropriate type, and 2) to say something is constrained by norms is to say there
do exist practices of an appropriate type. Rather than taking an ‘objectivist’ approach, I argue
that we should think of the distinction between causes and norms in terms of individual and
communal appraisal. The basic commitments of this appraisal-based view are 1) to say
something is determined by causes is to exclude it from our practices and thus to not hold it to
standards of correctness, and 2) to say something is constrained by norms is to include it in our
practices and thus to hold it to standards of correctness.
To see the difference between these two approaches, consider the distinction between a
norm-constrained meaningful utterance and a cause-constrained belch. An objectivist determines
whether a vocalization is a meaningful utterance or a belch by appealing to whether there exist
linguistic practices of an appropriate type. If there do exist linguistic practices of an appropriate
type, then the vocalization is a meaningful utterance, while if there do not, then the vocalization
is a belch. Were an objectivist to reassess a meaningful utterance as a belch or vice-versa, they
would hold that they were formerly mistaken about the existence or non-existence of the
appropriate linguistic practices. On my appraisal-based view, in contrast, to assess a vocalization
as a meaningful utterance is to include it in our linguistic practices, while to assess a vocalization
as a belch is to exclude it from our linguistic practices. When we reassess a meaningful utterance

The ‘Objectivist’ view that I criticize is extremely pervasive in analytic philosophy and the social sciences.
Exemplars include Bicchieri (2005), Hawkins, Goodman, & Goldstone (2019), and Boyd & Richardson (2001).
Such views typically identify specifically ‘social norms’ with regularities in group behavior and some cluster of
psychological states.
3
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as a belch, we exclude an utterance that once found a place in our linguistic practices from our
linguistic practices and thereby ‘make it into’ a mere belch.4
Given this admittedly rough characterization of the distinction between cause and norm, I
will proceed with my arguments. In §2.1, I will examine two different accounts of reflection
through an examination of two different views of what ‘thinking about’ amounts to. The first
view understands ‘thinking about’ in terms of causal relations, while the second view
understands ‘thinking about’ in terms of proper inferences. Following this, I will turn in §2.2 to a
third ‘Korsgaardian’ account of reflection that attempts to combine both causal and normative
elements by means of what I call ‘pre-normative first-personal necessity.’ Here, I will argue that
this account of reflection involves a viewpoint shift, and that once we become aware of this
viewpoint shift, we encounter two very different sorts of reflection: Reflections identified as
‘one’s own’ and reflections identified as ‘merely caused’. Following this, I will examine in §2.3
a few ways that these two kinds of reflection might differ from one another. I will reject a ‘deep
metaphysical’ distinction where the former originate causal chains and the latter belong to causal
chains, and instead argue for a practice-based distinction where the former is included in our
evaluative practices and the latter is excluded from them. I will then in §2.4 refine this practicebased distinction and apply it to the ‘Korsgaardian’ bifurcation.
2
2.1

TOWARDS A PRACTICAL CONCEPTION
The Interface
"A lower animal's attention is fixed on the world. Its perceptions are its beliefs,
and its desires are its will. It is engaged in conscious activities, but it is not
conscious of them. That is, they are not the objects of its attention. But we human
animals turn our attention on to our perceptions and desires themselves, and we

4

As we shall see in §3, such a reassessment may still be practically improper even if it cannot be referentially
mistaken.
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are conscious of them. That is why we can think about them.” (Korsgaard 1996:
79)
The italicized prepositions hint at a mystery in this otherwise commonsensical account of
the ‘human animal’. If we excluded the prepositions, the claim that human beings can ‘think’ in
addition to desiring and perceiving would be no more mysterious than the claim that a bat has a
faculty of echolocation in addition to faculties of sight and touch. However, once we’ve included
the prepositions, a general theory of ‘aboutness’ is needed.
Given the distinction between cause and norm discussed in 1, there are two directions in
which we might try to develop such a theory. First, we might try to account for ‘aboutness’ in
terms of causal relations between thought contents and perception/desire contents. In this case,
the properties that we ascribe to ‘aboutness’ would be of the sort that we ascribe to entities that
are ordinarily excluded from our evaluative practices. Consider for example the properties we
typically ascribe to entities like atomic nuclei, clouds, and solar systems. In most cases, these
properties are such that if we were to find atomic nuclei, clouds, and solar systems lacking them,
we would not consider them defective or incomplete. Instead, we would introduce a new genus
or reclassify the property as accidental. To account for ‘thinking about’ in these terms would
similarly involve identifying properties that are such that absent them, a case of ‘thinking about’
would not be defective or incomplete. On the other hand, we might try to account for ‘thinking
about’ in normative terms by ascribing it properties of the sort that we ascribe to entities that are
included in our evaluative practices. In this case, ‘thinking about’ would involve a kind of
accountability: One could ‘think about’ more or less well.
There are clear benefits and drawbacks to both directions. If we began by giving a causal
explanation, then the interface between thought contents and perception/desire contents would be
explained in the same way that the interface between perception/desire contents and objects-in-

7
the-world is (that is, in causal terms).5 Such an approach would thus lend itself to a high degree
of explanatory elegance. However, such explanatory elegance would come at the expense of
feasibility, requiring a large-scale recharacterization of terms. If, on the other hand, we began by
giving a normative explanation, we would already have a reservoir of terms drawn from ordinary
practical life at our disposal. But while explanatory elegance came at the expense of feasibility
before, here feasibility may come at the expense of explanatory elegance.
To see how, consider a normative ‘inferentialist’ explanation of ‘thinking about.’ On this
sort of explanation, someone is only ‘thinking about’ insofar as they are disposed to draw
inferences of an appropriate type. Candidate normative properties of ‘thinking about’ would
include a disjunction of principles of formal logic, a disjunction of grammatical and syntactical
rules, and the requirements of temporally extended thought.6 Such an explanation would also
specify normative properties of ‘thinking about x.’ If ‘x’ were cause-determined, it would
involve principles governing explanations that always avoid the ascription of normative
properties. Furthermore, if ‘x’ were norm-constrained, it would involve principles governing
explanations that involve the ascription of normative properties. An example of a case where x is
cause-determined would be if it is an atomic nucleus. Typically, when we ‘think about’ atomic
nuclei we don’t ascribe properties to them such that absent these properties the atomic nuclei
would be defective or incomplete. An example where x is norm-constrained, on the other hand,
would be if x is a dog. In many contexts (being a veterinarian, for example), ‘thinking about’ a

I refer to ‘thought contents’ and ‘perception/desire contents’ rather than ‘thoughts’ and ‘perceptions/desires’ to
highlight how, if we were to provide a strictly causal explanation, we’d have to (re-)characterize the latter in a way
that doesn’t involve the ascription of normative properties.
6
The first disjunction would contain such principles as modus ponens, modus tollens, the law of non-contradiction,
the law of the excluded middle, and so on. The second disjunction would contain rules governing word order,
pronoun use, and so on (I assume—perhaps without much warrant—that the medium of ‘thinking about’ is one’s
spoken or written language). Finally, the requirements of temporally extended thought would include retentional and
recollective requirements. This account is schematic and thus may prove inadequate upon further study.
5
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dog would involve ascribing that dog a property of having four legs such that if it lacked that
property, it would be defective as a dog.
If we understood ‘thinking about’ in this manner, thinking about perceptions and desires
would amount to being disposed to draw inferences of an appropriate type. Thus, to think about
these perceptions and desires as cause-constrained would be to pursue explanations that always
avoid the ascription of normative properties. For example, to think about my desire for coffee as
cause-constrained would be to think that odor particles have traveled through the air from the
cup to my nostrils, that olfactory neurons in my nostrils have responded to those, and so on.
Furthermore, because coffee, cups, nostrils, and so on are ordinarily characterized in a way that
involves the ascription of normative properties, it would be to pursue recharacterizations of these
things, and recharacterizations of these recharacterizations, and so on.
2.2

A Bridge Between the Normative and the Non-Normative?
Now, it is obvious that we do not ordinarily ‘think about’ our perceptions and desires in

this way. Rather, our perceptions and desires typically play roles in practical and theoretical
reflections, viz., reflections about how to act and what to believe. Consider, for example, the role
that the desire plays in this account of practical reflection:
I desire and I find myself with a powerful impulse to act. But I back up and bring
that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse
doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I act? Is this desire really a
reason to act? (Korsgaard 1996: 79)
As I read Korsgaard, what is being described here is a diachronic process in which a ‘desire’
goes from being a cause-constrained impulse to a normative reason, where the impulse occurs
pre-reflectively and the reason occurs in reflection. Because this is supposed to be an account of
the source of a normative reason (and of normativity more generally), it is thought not to be itself
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constrained by norms in the manner of the previous accounts of ‘thinking about.’7 Instead, it is
supposed to have a causal origin and to be partly cause-constrained.
Central to this conception of practical reflection is the idea of a kind of pre-normative
first-personal necessity. When one is caused to enter the activity of reflection, the only ways that
this activity can end are if a) one finds a normative reason, or b) an outside cause interferes with
the activity of reflection. In principle, (b) could occur any time one is caused to reflect, in which
case the activity would not result in a normative reason. However, Korsgaard thinks that (a) does
as a matter of fact occur, and that this explains the existence of rational actions, which are actend pairs like ‘go to the store to get some ice cream.’
For Korsgaard, then, the ‘bridge’ between the non-normative and the normative is a kind
of pre-normative necessity. She takes pains to point out that this necessity isn’t causal, logical,
rational, or normative.8 Instead, it is a ‘first-personal’ necessity arising out of the ‘natural’ fact of
self-consciousness: Upon being caused to reflect, I am condemned to seek a reason. I cannot not
seek a reason upon being so caused, even if some external cause may interrupt the activity of
reflection. Consider, e.g., a case where the odor of freshly baked cookies passes by ‘my’ nostrils,
stimulating olfactory neurons and causing a desire, which in conjunction with some other causal
events that have primed me to reflect in such conditions, causes the activity of reflection. At this
point, I emerge out of this activity as someone who must find a reason to act, but who at the same
time ‘has’ a desire suggesting an act. So, I reflect on whether the act suggested by the desire is an
act that I have a reason to do. I may consider that I am on a diet, and that eating cookies would

It was pointed out to me that on this account, the thoughts expressed by ‘shall I act?’ and ‘Is this desire really a
reason to act?’ are not yet norm constrained. We thus could not rely on normative principles to account for the
content of such thoughts.
8
Korsgaard writes at the very start of Self-Constitution that "the necessity of choosing and acting is not causal,
logical, or rational necessity. It is our plight: the simply inexorable fact of the human condition” (Korsgaard 2009:
2). Here, I have identified the necessity of choosing and acting with the necessity of reflection.
7
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wreck that diet, in which case I may have a reason to abstain. On the other hand, I may consider
that I haven’t eaten anything all day, and that I am hungry, in which case I may have a reason to
eat the cookies. Both my being on a diet and my being hungry may be reflectively scrutinized,
but at some point, I would arrive at a reason to act, which would in turn normatively necessitate a
rational action. This process is illustrated in simplified form in the following diagram:

Figure 1
My first critique of this picture concerns the pre-normative necessity that is thought to
generate a reason out of the activity of reflection. The worry is that this pre-normative necessity
is passively experienced causal necessity, and that all on its own this is not enough to generate a
normative reason.9 Consider that when ‘condemned’ to seek a reason, we cannot choose to do
otherwise. Ordinarily, when we cannot choose to do otherwise, we ascribe what ‘we’ do to an

9

We might also consider the possibility of pre-normative necessity being a kind of rational necessity, an example of
which is described here: “If Diotima believes that all women are mortal, and Diotima reflects that she is a woman,
and the relation between these two propositions is evident to her, then Diotima must believe that she is mortal. She
is confronted with the necessity of believing in her own mortality” (Korsgaard, Response: 7). This might seem to be
an especially attractive candidate for pre-normative necessity because like normative necessity and unlike causal
necessity, one can be confronted with rational necessity and not give into it. However, we should be cautious, for
this similarity might be evidence that rational necessity is a species of normative necessity, and thus not a viable
candidate for pre-normative necessity. Further reason to think that rational necessity is a species of normative
necessity comes from the suggestion that the principles of logic may play constitutive roles in rational thought, such
that failure to accord with them indicates a defect in thinking (See my account of ‘thinking about’ in §2.1 and my
account of ‘incompatibility’ in §3.3).
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external cause; someone who cannot choose to not fall is caused to fall by the force of gravity,
someone who cannot choose to not twitch is caused to twitch by a disturbance to the central
nervous system, and so on. Similarly, someone who cannot choose to not reflect is caused to
reflect by an external cause.10 This much is already explicit in the above diagram, but the worry
arises if we accept with Korsgaard that in order for our reflective activity to generate a reason,
we must value that reflective activity.
As a point of clarification, Korsgaard thinks that in order for our reflective activity to
generate a reason, we must value ourselves as human beings, where a ‘human being’ is “a
reflective animal who needs reasons to act and to live” (Korsgaard 1996: 121). The problem is
that awareness of being condemned to reflection, understood in causal terms, does not obviously
entail valuing oneself as a thing that needs reasons to act and to live. It is conceivable for a being
to exist who is aware that she will be caused to reflect in certain circumstances, but who does not
value her reflective nature. We may imagine that when she is caused to reflect, she disassociates
from her reflective activity, which continues aimlessly until interrupted by an outside cause. If a
being like this could exist, then the attempt to derive normative necessity from pre-normative
necessity would be in serious trouble.
It may be worried that we are mistakenly assuming that self-awareness does not itself
have its source in reflective activity. If we were to accept that self-awareness itself has its source
in reflective activity, then we may argue that our imagined being is reflectively ‘disassociating’
from her ‘reflective activity.’11 In this case, it is reasonable to think that she values the reflective
It is important to note that on this picture, even though the reflector ‘has no say’ on whether they reflect, they do
‘have a say’ about how the reflections proceed. They can, in other words, ‘choose’ which considerations are relevant
and which considerations are irrelevant. What ‘having a say’ and ‘choosing’ amounts to, though, is fraught with
controversy. In this paper, I argue that these concepts are only intelligible as normative concepts, but there have
been attempts to argue that they consist in dispositions and abilities (see e.g., Clark (2009).
11
This isn’t a departure from Korsgaard’s position. Consider, e.g., Korsgaard’s claim: “[…] the human mind is selfconscious in the sense that it is essentially reflective” (Korsgaard 1996: 93).
10
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activity through which she disassociates from her ‘merely caused reflective activity.’ If she
thinks ‘I was caused to reflect, but I do not value that part of myself,’ she is valuing the part of
herself that is reflecting now. A few moments later, she may go on to think ‘A moment ago I was
caused to reflect, but I do not value that part of myself,’ again valuing the part of herself that is
reflecting now, and so on. What we find here is that this imagined being is stuck between two
conceptions of her own reflective nature. Her occurrent reflections are her own, and valued
accordingly, while her past reflections that she is reflecting about are merely caused.
It follows that pre-normative necessity, understood as awareness that one is caused to
reflect, only indirectly entails self-valuing. It entails self-valuing in the way that self-awareness
in general entails self-valuing: To be self-aware I must be reflecting, but for me to be reflecting I
must value my reflections as my own.12 But, as suggested by our imagined being, this conception
of reflection is very different from the ‘merely caused’ conception of reflection apparently on
display in Figure 1. In the proceeding pages, I will develop a positive account of these two types
of reflection, drawing from the distinction between cause and norm discussed in section 1.
2.3

Two Types of Reflection
Consider as prelude an arguably mistaken reading of the Kantian story according to

which a being engaged in practical reflection must “be the first cause of all [her] actions”
(Lectures on Metaphysics: 28:269). According to this basically objectivist view, there is a deep
metaphysical distinction between the two types of reflection: The first type (the one that is
identified as ‘merely caused’) is a part of a causal chain originating in the world, while the other
type (the one that is identified as ‘one’s own’) originates a novel causal chain. It is important to

12

As we will see in the next section, this notion of valuing is one in which a kind of authority is conferred upon the
valued thing, such that the thing is brought into and changes a broader network of proprieties and improprieties.
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notice that on an objectivist account like this, there is no real place for a substantive notion of
valuing in our characterization of ‘her own’ reflections: Either valuing on such a view can be
given a causal reduction (perhaps it is understood as a psychological state) or it is not essential to
‘her own’ reflections. Consequently, if we were to hold that valuing is a non-reducible normative
property and that it is essential to ‘her own’ reflections, then we would have to reject the view
that the distinction can be apprehended from within the objectivist standpoint.13
Is there reason to think that valuing is a non-reducible normative property that is essential
to ‘her own’ reflections? I think so, but to see why, consider the following intuitive sketch: When
our imagined being values a thought, it is thereby granted a kind of authority. In the case that we
have imagined, the thought reduces another thought to the status of the ‘merely caused’ and
thereby changes what further thoughts would yield an inconsistency. We can think of the thought
as analogous to the disavowal of a chess move by a chess player, for just as the disavowal would
change what further moves would violate the rules, the thought would change what further
thoughts would yield an inconsistency (I will explain this more thoroughly in §3). We should
exercise caution, for although the disavowal of the chess move is not itself governed by the rules
of chess, it is governed by the rules of further practices, e.g., those which set the boundaries of
the game. Consequently, our imagined player could always be in violation of these rules in
disavowing the move. From this, we could infer that a valued thought is analogous to a move in a
rule-governed practice and a contradiction is analogous to a rule-violation in a rule-governed
practice. Just as a move in a rule-governed practice changes which further moves are rulefollowing and rule-violating, the thought changes which further thoughts are rule-following and
rule-violating.

Another worry is that the view that reflection R occurring at T1 is a ‘first cause’ at T1 but then that same R
occurring at T1 is ‘caused’ at T2 doesn’t make sense on any standard view of causality.
13
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Were we to accept that reflections identified as ‘one’s own’ are essentially norm-laden in
the manner discussed in the previous paragraph, I suggest that there would be reason to conceive
of the distinction from an appraisal-based view: Reflections identified as ‘one’s own’ would be
included in our evaluative practices, while reflections identified as ‘merely caused’ would be
excluded from them. Consider this by analogy with chess: In recognizing someone as playing
chess, we must hold them to be bound by the rules of the game. It is not enough that we merely
notice that there are pieces on a board in front of them, that they are picking up those pieces and
moving them around, and so on. In a similar manner, to recognize her reflections as ‘her own’
rather than ‘merely caused’ would be to hold her to be bound by certain rules.
If we accept this much, we find that 1) because going from recognizing reflections that
are ‘merely caused’ to recognizing reflections that are ‘her own’ requires us to make a shift such
that we are now holding her to be bound by certain rules, an argument that doesn’t mention this
shift in its premises (like Korsgaard’s) wouldn’t have derived normative conclusions from nonnormative premises, and 2) normativity would not have its source in reflective activity, for the
relevant reflections would themselves already be constrained by norms.
Even if we were to accept (1) and (2), it may be objected that the chess analogy suggests
a misleading picture of ‘one’s own’ reflections. That is, it suggests that we should think of these
reflections as equivalent to a game consisting of a set of inferences that are equivalent to moves.
On this picture, a reflector might infer ‘go to the library’ from ‘read Swann’s Way’, where a part
of what would make this inference good would be that it accords with a rule holding that means
should be inferred from ends. Even if this were a viable model of reflection, it is not the only one
that can be thought of, and it is not the one that Korsgaard has in mind. That is, from a KantianKorsgaardian perspective, we have conceived of reflection as maxim construction, but reflection
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properly conceived is maxim evaluation. On a maxim construction model, reflection would
involve drawing inferences between the parts of maxims that are good according to whether they
accord with rules originating from outside the activity of reflection. On a maxim evaluation
model like Korsgaard’s, in contrast, such rules are supposed to have a source that is internal to
the activity of reflection.
2.4

A Clarification of Korsgaard’s Position
Here, I should clarify an ambiguity in my earlier description of Korsgaardian practical

reflection. As I have described it, an agent is prompted to reflect when confronted by a desire
suggesting an act, e.g., the act ‘eat the cookies’, and reflection consists in seeking what I have
called a ‘reason’ to do or not do that act. Because reflection is prompted by a suggested act and
not a maxim (a suggested act-end pair), and because the reason seems very much like an end, we
may think that Korsgaardian practical reflection is a maxim construction model. However, such a
thought is mistaken: For Korsgaard, practical reflection is prompted by maxims, which are then
tested to determine whether they embody reasons.14 To put this another way, rather than being
confronted with an act like ‘eat the cookies’ and then reflectively seeking an end like ‘to satisfy
my sweet tooth’, an agent is confronted with a maxim like ‘eat the cookies to satisfy my sweet
tooth’ and then reflectively tests that maxim to determine whether satisfying her sweet tooth is
really a reason to eat the cookies.15

14

Korsgaard writes: "Kant's question [and, it turns out, her own] is whether the act and the end are so arranged, or
related to one another, that the maxim can serve as a law" (Korsgaard 2009: 15). Further: “the reason for an action is
not something outside of or behind or separate from the action at all, for explicating the action and explicating the
reason, are the same thing. Rather, an action is an essentially intelligible object that embodies a reason, the way a
sentence is an essentially intelligible object that embodies a thought" (Korsgaard 2009: 16).
15
We should note a tension between the earlier view that desires prompt reflection and the current view that maxims
prompt reflection. On a conception of desires as brute facts, it is reasonable to think that they could at most serve as
something like ‘raw material’ on a maxim construction model. That is, because a desire that did not prompt
reflection would translate into ‘mere motion’ lacking any goal or aim, we might think that if it did prompt reflection,
it would at most specify a goalless act. Consider the case where the odor of freshly baked cookies passes by ‘my’
nostrils, stimulating olfactory neurons and causing a desire. If we understand this desire as a brute fact, the most

16
On this picture, reflection generates rational action when a maxim successfully ‘passes’
evaluative reflection, which involves its being willed as universal law.16 Willing the maxim as
universal law makes the action ‘one’s own’, for “if all my decisions were particular and
anomalous, there would be no identifiable difference between my acting and an assortment of
first-order impulses being causally effective in or through my body” (Korsgaard 1996: 228). For
me (emphasis on the ‘me’) to eat the cookies to satisfy my sweet tooth, I must be committed to
making the world such that anyone in it would act similarly in similar circumstances. If I am not
so committed, then I am reduced to an assortment of causally effective first-order impulses,
where these are basically equivalent to desires.

reasonable rendering of ‘being confronted’ by the desire would be: Becoming aware of the kinds of motions that the
desire would have caused if left unimpeded by reflection. But if being ‘confronted’ by a desire is understood in this
way, desires are clearly inadequate for serving as suggestions for action. Because actions contain ends, the act
specified by the desire would need to be reflectively supplemented with an end. In this case, we may suspect that we
would need to posit two phases of reflection: An initial maxim construction phase prompted by a desire and a later
maxim testing phase prompted by a maxim. In the first phase, I would initially be aware of bodily motions that
would have been caused by the desire had I not been prompted to reflect and then I would reflectively append an end
to an act identified with these motions. For example, I would start by being aware that my arm would have reached
for the cookies had I not been caused to reflect and then I would append in reflection an end like ‘to eat a cookie’ to
the motions-cum-act of ‘reach for the cookie.’ The strangeness of inferring ends from acts rather than the other way
around should prompt concern here, but this is the position that we are led to if we accept that a) desires are brute
facts, and b) only maxims can serve as suggestions for action.
16
As a point of clarification, the standard here is not whether one possesses a psychological state of ‘universal
willing,’ but is rather whether one is committed to 1) acting similarly in similar circumstances, and 2) making the
world such that anyone in it would act similarly in similar circumstances. Meeting (1) would constitute one as an
egoist agent, while meeting (2) would constitute one as a moral agent. Although demonstrating the constitutive role
of (2) is a challenge, the constitutive role of (1) can be demonstrated through consideration of an apparent
counterexample: Someone decides to act just this once and never again. Although it is not immediately obvious, this
can be interpreted as both a case of universal willing and a case of particularistic willing. It is a case of universal
willing if they are willing a very precise maxim and what is meant by ‘just this once and never again’ is just that
they would never find themselves in circumstances where they could act on that maxim ever again. It is a case of
particularistic willing, on the other hand, if they are not willing a maxim at all. To will a maxim, whether a general
one like ‘reach for the cookies to take a bite’ or a specific one like ‘reach for the cookies to take a bite on this day at
this time in this place …’, is just to make the maxim into a law. To will a maxim that doesn’t specify time or
location would be to make a law that holds regardless of when and where you are. Thus, to will ‘reach for the
cookies to take a bite’ would have the absurd result of making it law that you reach for the cookies to take a bite all
the time and everywhere. From this, we find that if willing maxims is not going to lead to absurdity, one would have
to construct very precise maxims. We thus find that (1) captures the active dimension of agency, for the prospect of
commitment motivates agents to include as much as possible in the scope of what they will.
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The claim that first-personal universal willing marks one off as an agent rather than an
assortment of causally effective first-order impulses should strike us as odd, especially when we
consider that the reflections and actions of a universal willer can always be reclassified as caused
motions. We can infer that the recognition that one is a universal willer, and thus an agent, must
involve adopting a perspective that is distinct from the perspective we take with respect to them
when we tell a causal story. This is the perspective Korsgaard has called the “plural first-person,”
which is one where “we are joined with others in the processes of deliberation and justification"
(Korsgaard, 2002: 55). It is from within this perspective that one is intelligible as an agent only if
they universalize their maxims and it is from within this perspective that not universalizing their
maxims reduces them to an assortment of causally effective first-order impulses.
If we are attentive to the perspectival difference, we can avoid a potential equivocation
between the ‘merely caused’ that is ascribed in the plural first-person and the ‘caused’ that is
ascribed in the third-person. To say that something is ‘merely caused’ is to exclude it from our
practices, while to say something is ‘caused’ is to undertake to tell a deterministic story.17 The
distinction between the greeting ‘hello’ and a belch that sounds like ‘hello’ is a plural firstperson distinction between an utterance occurring inside our specifically linguistic practices and
a ‘merely caused’ vocalization excluded from our linguistic practices. From a third-personal
perspective there is no place for this kind of distinction. Rather, from the third-person, the
distinction between the greeting and the belch is a distinction between two different causal
streams.
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Whether we can maintain the perspectival difference and the two kinds of causes depends on whether undertaking
to tell a deterministic story is coextensive with undertaking to exclude as much as possible from our practices. I have
assumed that it is not, although more work needs to be done in defense of this view.
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With this perspectival difference in place, we can reevaluate the bifurcated conception of
the human being in terms of the plural first-person. Rather than classifying perceptions and
desires as ‘caused’ in the third-personal sense, we can instead classify them as ‘merely caused’ in
the plural first-personal sense. In that case, the human being would be divided into a reflective
part that is included in our practices and a perceptual/desiderative part that is excluded from our
practices. Here, to include the reflective part in our practices is to hold it to standards of
correctness. It is to treat it as the sort of thing that can succeed or fail, be corrected or damaged,
and in general be evaluated. To exclude the perceptual/desiderative part from our practices is to
not hold it to standards of correctness. It is to treat it very much as we treat atomic nuclei and
clouds, as the sort of thing for which evaluation is inapt.
An advantage of adopting such a practice-based account of the bifurcation is the rational
and perceptual/desiderative parts are apprehended from within the same perspective. Rather than
alternating between a third-personal perspective that leaves no room for rationality and a plural
first-personal perspective that leaves no room for perceptions and desires (or worse, sticking to a
third-personal perspective and reducing rationality to a causal stream), the bifurcation can be
apprehended from within a perspective accommodating both reason and the relevant forms of
perception/desire.18
Now, although Korsgaard’s plural-first person accommodates something very much like
my practice-based view, it does involve a few dubious assumptions. Consider, for example, that
it gives priority to the first-personal perspective, which builds in a cause-constrained conception
of perceptions and desires. That is, when first-personally conceived, perceptions and desires are
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By ‘relevant forms’ I mean the forms that can serve as suggestions to reason.
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presented as entities that one is ‘confronted with’ from the ‘outside’—as, in other words, entities
lying outside of our evaluative practices.
Although I do not have space to argue that a practice-based characterization does not
need to be tethered to the first-personal perspective, it is worth noticing that there is at least a
conceptual distinction to be drawn here. We may consider, for example, that there is room for
both first-personal and second-personal perspectives in the very same practice of baseball: A
player stuck on second base may first-personally perceive that the pitcher has thrown the ball to
the catcher and then attempt to steal base while an umpire participating in that same practice may
second-personally call out that player for attempting to steal base on a foul ball.
3
3.1

THE PRACTICAL AND THE REAL
Some Anti-Realism Worries
The position described here might be thought to be untenably anti-realistic because of the

appraisal-dependency of norm and mere cause. That is, by explaining norms in terms of practical
inclusion and mere causes in terms of practical exclusion, something that is neither assessed as a
norm nor a mere cause might be thought to be left ‘indeterminate’ between the two. This worry
can be offset, although not entirely done away with, by noticing that when we conceive of the
kinds of cases that provoke these indeterminacy worries, we are often shifting from a thirdpersonal to a practical perspective and treating whatever is third-personally conceived as
‘indeterminate’ because we haven’t done a pragmatic reduction. In other words, the thought that
the unappraised thing is ‘indeterminant’ results from a failure to acknowledge what we are doing
when we are third-personally conceiving, where the explanation offered here is that we are
practically excluding. To make this clearer, consider the following case:
Someone makes a sound at T1 which is then assessed at T2 as either a meaningful
utterance or as a mere sound.
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The worry for the appraisal-based view is that the sound at T1 is ‘indeterminate’: It is
neither a meaningful utterance nor a mere sound. To offset this worry, notice that we are
conceiving the ‘person’ making a sound at T1 from the third person, in which case we are
practically excluding and the sound at T1 is merely caused. We are then either going on to give
an account of the assessment at T2 from the third person, in which case our account involves a
reduction of the distinction between norm and mere cause to two causal streams, or we are
giving an account of the assessment at T2 from the practical point of view, in which case we are
shifting perspectives to one where the distinction between norm and mere cause can be
apprehended as such. If we go with the former then the distinction corresponds to two ways of
practically excluding, while if we go with the latter then the distinction corresponds to practical
inclusion and exclusion. This explanation offsets rather than defuses the worry because we can
always ask in virtue of what we are practically including or excluding. We can then divert this
further worry through an analysis of what we are doing when we ask that question, and so on in a
regress. Consider next this case:
Someone assesses the thought ‘I want to read Proust’ as a reason to go to the
library at T1 and reassesses the thought as a mere desire at T2.
The worry for the appraisal-based view is that if something’s being a reason or a mere
desire consists in nothing other than its being assessed as such, the thought trivially goes from
being a reason at T1 to being a mere desire at T2. This is to accuse the view of something like
the second horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma vis-à-vis norms and causes. Although there is
something to this worry (which I will come back to in a moment) the way that it is framed here
makes it susceptible to the same kind of pragmatic reduction as in the last case.
To see how, consider that one and the same ‘thought’ is supposed to be assessed as a
reason at T1 and as a mere desire at T2. What is the status of this ‘thought’ that persists from T1
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to T2 and is assessed differently each time? One possibility is that this ‘thought’ is a thirdpersonally conceived causal entity, in which case we might suspect there of being either a
perspectival shift or a reduction. It might be held that a perspectival shift is off the table because
unlike the last case there is no time at which the ‘thought’ is unassessed, however this would be
to confuse what is being conceived with the conception: It isn’t as if in order to conceive of a
case where something happens at T1 followed by something happening at T2, we must first
conceive of the thing that happens at T1 at T11 from one perspective and then the thing that
happens at T2 at T12 from one perspective. We could instead conceive of the thing happening at
T1 from P1 at T11 and then from P2 at T12 followed by the thing happening at T2 from P1 at T13
and then from P2 at T14. Regardless of how these conceptions proceed, we could then give an
account of what we are doing when we are conceiving much as we did before.
Perhaps rather than thinking of ‘the thought’ as a third-personally conceived causal
entity, we should think of it by appeal to the nature of conception. More precisely, it may be that
what is designated by ‘the thought’ is indeterminate conception itself: Much as it is indeterminate
whether an object seen from a distance is a rock or a house, it is indeterminate whether a thought
is a reason or mere desire. We can notice that to think in these terms involves the introduction of
a representing (a conception indeterminate between a rock or house) and a represented (a rock or
house), thereby making it a basically objectivist view. However—and this will be clearer in the
next sections—there may be a way to account for such representings and representeds in terms of
proprieties that are fixed by social practices that we have endorsed.
In the next section, I will start to develop a more sophisticated version of the appraisalbased view that leaves room for indeterminate conception and even ‘mistake’, where ‘mistake’
occurs in cases where e.g., a thought is reassessed as normative even though it is ‘really’ caused.
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The account I will develop will not depend on an ‘external’ standard (one that does not in the end
depend on appraisal) for cause and norm, and neither will it require us to reconceive the
assessment that something is a cause or a norm along referential lines.
3.2

Assessments Within Communal Practices We Have Endorsed
One way to start to leave room for something like ‘mistake’ on the appraisal view would

be to notice (what is already hinted at in §2.3) that the assessment that an utterance is meaningful
or mere noise is itself a move made inside a practice. Not unlike ordinary games, the practices in
which such assessments are made vary a great deal, but they are alike in involving proprieties
and improprieties. While in one practice, the assessment that an utterance is meaningful rather
than mere noise would be proper, in another that very same assessment would be improper.
Consider a speaker who assesses her own past utterance as meaningful. In a communal practice
embodying the Enlightenment ideal of personal autonomy, it would likely be inappropriate—a
violation of communal norms—for another agent to fail to defer to that agent’s assessment of the
meaningfulness of her own utterance. But now consider a communal practice embodying the
serf-king dynamic of feudal Europe. In such a case it would likely be appropriate—where this
means in accord with communal norms—for an agent to defer to a king’s assessments of a serf’s
utterances as meaningless even in the teeth of the serf’s protestations.
Given these observations, we might try to revise our account of meaningfulness from ‘x
is a meaningful utterance iff and because it is assessed to be’ to ‘x is a meaningful utterance iff
and because it is properly assessed to be, where the propriety of this assessment is fixed by social
practices.’ Notice that although no room would be left on this view for mistake, understood on
objectivist lines, room would be left for impropriety. In a social practice embodying the
Enlightenment ideal of personal autonomy, Y’s assessment that X’s utterance is meaningless,
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where X herself assessed her utterance as meaningful, would be improper. Y’s assessment would
thus fail to ground the meaninglessness of X’s utterance.
It may be worried that by grounding meaning in social practices rather than assessments,
we appear to have endorsed an objectivist account of meaning. To see the problem with such an
objectivist account of meaning, we need only consider the difficulty faced by us, denizens of the
post-Enlightenment, in assessing the serf’s utterance (and protests) as meaningless. Communal
practices according to which a king’s assessments ground meaningfulness are not ones that we
can endorse without violating the norms of the social practices we have endorsed. This may
suggest this further reformulation (FR): “X is a meaningful utterance iff and because it is
properly assessed to be, where the propriety of this assessment is fixed by social practices we
have endorsed.’
But with this, the realist may object that we have simply pushed the Euthyphro problem
back, for now the endorsement of a social practice seems to be a trivial and arbitrary matter.
Further, once we recall that to assess a noise as a meaningful utterance is to include it in our
evaluative practices, the view would seem to face a circularity objection: An utterance is
included in our evaluative practices when it is properly assessed to be, where the propriety of this
assessment is fixed by social practices we have endorsed.
However, both objections can be met. The circularity objection can be met by noticing
that it equivocates between ‘evaluative practices’ and ‘social practices.’ These need not be the
same thing and may even be such that one is embedded in the other: On my view, in fact,
evaluative practices are embedded within social practices.19 This response to the circularity
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This is just the by now familiar claim that there are proprieties governing the ascription of normative properties.
For example, it is improper in the Modern Scientific Worldview social practice to ascribe a property to Tungsten
such that a sample of Tungsten lacking it would be defective or incomplete (instead, we’d reclassify). On the other
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objection goes a long way toward my response to the objection that we’ve simply pushed the
Euthyphro problem back: Even if it were conceded that the endorsement of a given social
practice is a trivial and arbitrary matter—which is not a view I accept—we would still have
addressed the worry that meaningfulness is a trivial and arbitrary matter, for we can bracket the
question of whether we are (or whether it even makes sense of say we are) ‘mistaken’ in our
endorsement of our post-enlightenment social practice, and instead concern ourselves with
whether the assessment of an utterance as mere noise is inapt. Recall, for example, the case
where we assess an agent’s utterance as mere noise even as she protests that it is meaningful: [In
the post-Enlightenment social practice we have endorsed] Our assessment is inapt (assuming
she’s sane, an adult, and so on) while hers is proper.
3.3

Rationality and Incompatibility
It may be worried that the way we have framed our post-Enlightenment social practice

pays insufficient attention to the specifically rational constitution of the agents involved. That is,
it isn’t as if whenever an agent affirms the meaningfulness of her own utterance, it is thereby
meaningful. Consider cases where in affirming the meaningfulness of her own utterance, an
agent is undertaking incompatible commitments. Say that a Proust devotee affirms the
meaningfulness of an assertion to the effect that she despises and has always despised Proust. If
rather than claiming that she had made a shift in her commitments or that she had been lying all
along she continues to proclaim her admiration of Proust while defending the meaningfulness of
this assertion, [In the post-enlightenment social practice we have endorsed] either the assertion

hand, it is proper in the Veterinarian Office social practice to ascribe a property to dogs (say having four legs) such
that a dog lacking four legs would be defective as a dog.
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must be revised as mere noise, or the speaker’s status as a rational speaker is called into
question.20
Before continuing, I should say something about how I understand ‘commitments.’ Rather
than thinking of commitments along objectivist lines as intentions (which I understand to be
private attitudes), I think of commitments as statuses constituted by certain proprieties. If
someone is committed to taking their opponent’s queen in a game of chess, this is to be made
sense of in terms of them being subject to a separate set of proprieties from if they are committed
to promoting their pawn. The moves that it would be appropriate for someone with the former
commitment to make would be different than the moves that it would be appropriate for someone
with the latter commitment to make. Further, because such proprieties are in the end ascribed by
us, there is not a serious conflict between an account of meaning that is grounded in whether
some speaker has the appropriate commitments and an account of meaning that is grounded in
whether some such utterance is assessed as meaningful. What it is to assess an utterance as
meaningful is to [properly] hold the speaker accountable for what they go on to say, where
holding a speaker accountable for what they go on to say constitutes their having certain
commitments.
With this account of ‘commitment’ out of the way, I will next turn to an account of
‘incompatibility.’ When I say that commitment to A is ‘incompatible’ with commitment to B I
have in mind cases where commitment to A precludes entitlement to B (and vice versa).21 Given
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This claim is analogous to the claim that if a chess player makes an illegal move, either the illegal move must be
revised as an accident, or the chess player’s status as a competent chess player is called into question. There is room
for vagueness here, for a single non-accidental illegal move doesn’t usually call into question whether someone is a
chess player (although this may depend on the move). It is only when non-accidental illegal moves become frequent
that a chess player’s status is called into question. Such vagueness also holds in the case of a speaker who asserts a
commitment that is incompatible with her other commitments: A single incompatible commitment doesn’t seriously
call into question her status as a rational speaker, but if they become frequent then we begin to question whether she
is a rational speaker.
21
In this respect, my account draws heavily from Brandom (1994).
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this, my use of ‘incompatible’ picks out an extremely broad genus, including material
incompatibilities, practical incompatibilities, and logical incompatibilities as species. Examples
include commitments to something’s being tungsten and its melting point being 500°C in the
material case, commitments to being a good teacher and regularly sleeping in while class would
be happening in the practical case, and commitments to that being a dog and that not being a dog
in the logical case. Someone who is committed to that being tungsten would thereby also be
committed to that having a melting point of 3,422°C and thus not entitled to that having a
melting point of 500°C; someone who is committed to being a good teacher would thereby also
be committed to showing up to class regularly and thus not entitled to regularly sleep in while
class would be happening; someone’s committed to that being a dog would also be committed to
that not-not being a dog and thus not entitled to that not being a dog, and so on.22
3.4

Concept and World
As suggested in the last section, the view developed here is not strictly anti-objectivist,

but instead aims to give an account of objectivism in terms of more fundamental normative
practices. Consider a case of ostension such as ‘that is Tungsten.’ On an objectivist reading, we
can think of the expression ‘that is Tungsten’ as an abbreviation for a complex proposition that
stands in or fails to stand in a representing relation to the facts. An appraisal theorist thinks that
when we say that this is an ‘abbreviation’ we are pointing to implicit proprieties: Someone who
asserts ‘that is Tungsten’ is thereby be entitled to assert ‘that has a melting point of 3,422°C’ and
not entitled to assert ‘that has a melting point of 500°C.’ Further, the appraisal theorist thinks

It goes without saying that speaking about incompatibilities doesn’t threaten a speaker’s rationality, for the
asserted commitments may be entirely compatible.
22

27
that what it is for ‘that is Tungsten’ to mean anything at all is for the speaker to be properly
subject to such proprieties, where to be properly subject to them is to be rational.
It may be suggested that we could accept that meaning depends on being properly subject
to proprieties and still accept a basically objectivist view according to which propositions stand
in or fail to stand in representing relations to facts. We could, for example, conceive of the
meaning-constituting proprieties as holding in a specifically discursive ‘realm’ that is separate
from, but potentially representative of, a ‘realm’ of facts. Against this view, it may be suggested
that as both discursive activity and non-discursive motions are temporally extended and spatially
situated, it is a prejudice (perhaps of talkative philosophers) to think that only the former could
be constrained by meaning-constituting proprieties. Why couldn’t the meaning of ‘that is
Tungsten’ be constituted not just by proprieties governing discursive behavior, but also
proprieties governing non-discursive behavior? Perhaps for ‘that is Tungsten’ to be meaningful,
it is not only proper for the speaker to be entitled to assert ‘that has a melting point of 3,422°C’
but also entitled to harvest it for use as filaments in light bulbs and not entitled to harvest it for
dinner.
The view that I am gesturing toward is one according to which mastery of certain
concepts depends upon us fully being in the world. To fully be in the world, on this view,
requires the contours of these proprieties to follow the world. The issue with someone who
asserts ‘that is Tungsten’ but who resolutely affirms that it can never be melted is not a failure of
correspondence between ‘their’ concept of Tungsten and the world, but rather that they have
failed, by their own lights, to master the concept.23 Such a failure is ‘by their own lights’ because
in judging something to be Tungsten, they are [in social practices we have endorsed] conferring a
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Of course, if saying that it can never be melted is a rhetorical exaggeration and they are committed to it having a
melting point of 3,422°C this would not be the case.
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kind of authority on it according to which it is to serve as a standard of correctness.24 Much more
remains to be said on this issue, but for now these remarks must suffice.
4

CONCLUSION
Over the course of this thesis, I have suggested a conceptual shift in how we think about

causes and norms. Rather than approaching the distinction from an objectivist standpoint, where
assessments are made but the world is left in place, I have defended an approach that locates us
in the practical world. That is, on my ‘appraisal-based’ view, to assess something as causedetermined is not a matter of identifying an absence of appropriate practices but is rather a matter
of excluding it from our practices. Further, to assess something as norm-constrained is not a
matter of identifying the presence of appropriate practices but is rather a matter of including it in
our practices. Once we’ve made this conceptual shift and applied it to the bifurcated conception
of the human being, we find that we can circumvent many of the problems that arise from
viewing the bifurcation from a third-personal perspective or both a third-personal perspective
and a plural first-personal perspective. That is, rather than having to give up reason or alternate
between two very different viewpoints, we can apprehend both reason and perception/desire
from within the same viewpoint.
The arguments presented in these pages constitute a kind of partial groundwork, more
like a nudge than a fully developed theory, for future ethical enquiry. We do not yet know where
it will lead, but we can suspect a few likely directions. If we recall our discussion of the
imagined being in §2.3, for example, we encountered the idea that excluding something from a
practice is itself a move made within a practice. Think of someone who disclaims the meaning of

Along these same lines, Brandom writes: “[…] taking or treating something in practice as a representing is taking
or treating it as subject to normative assessment as to its correctness, in a way in which what thereby counts as
represented serves as a standard” (Brandom, 2020, pp. 119)
24
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another’s utterances in the middle of a conversation. Such behavior would likely violate the rules
of proper etiquette, and if done repeatedly, would result in their exclusion from the conversation.
In this way, the rules of proper etiquette would contribute to the maintenance of meaningful
conversation, for only those who recognize the utterances of their co-participants as meaningful
would be included. Similar mechanisms may help maintain the bifurcation, but to demonstrate
this in a philosophically rigorous way would be an immense project.
Yet another large project appears on the horizon when we begin to suspect that a
practice-based characterization of the bifurcation would imply or at least make possible a kind of
agency-pluralism, perhaps of the sort recently defended by Lavin (2017). That is, in much the
same way that game-practices can come in many different forms, we might suspect that agencypractices can come in many different forms. Perhaps there are some communities for which the
inclusion of perceptions and desires in evaluative practices would be permitted or even actively
encouraged. Although these speculations may at first strike us as objectionably objectivist, there
may be a way to approach them in an appraisal-based manner.25 One strategy, already hinted at
in the last section, would be to adopt a kind of ‘bilingualism’ about agency in which
communities that maintain forms of agency very different from our own are included in our
evaluative practices.

Such speculations may strike us as ‘objectivist’, as I use the term, because they take the form of an inquiry into
whether such communities exist. There is no indication here that the intelligibility of such communities depends on
us taking a normative stance with respect to them.
25
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